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Asignificant numberof today'smost violent conflicts seem to be fueled, if not created, by the desire of nations to control their own states.
Recent headlines include renewed bombing by Basque separatists,
the outbreak of hostilities along the Eritrean-Ethiopianborder, demonstrations and clashes over secession in the Comoros, heightened tension between
China and Taiwan over the island's political status, investigations into past
violence in East Timor and reports of current violence in Aceh, and accusations of torture by Russian soldiers in Chechnya. It may not be a world war,
but much of the world is at war. What is going on here? And how can we
better understandit?
The nation-state principle posits an internationalsociety composed of sovereign nation-states. Although the assumption that nations and states should
be congruent may appear outdated or benign, it may create volatile expectations and lead to secessionist and irredentistclaims. These are likely to arise
when socioeconomic and political discontent becomes focused on discrepancies between the boundaries of historically and culturally distinct communities and the borders of states whose control over these groups is perceived as
illegitimate.
This article analyzes the normative frameworkwithin which nation-based
demands for political and territorialcontrol are articulatedand addressed.The
goal is to introduce greater conceptual clarity into debates about the nature
and validity of these claims. The French Revolution is often upheld as the
birthplace of the modern nation-state and of modern nationalism more
O 2001 InternationalStudies Association
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generally.'Althoughoversimplified,this acceptedwisdom offers a fruitfulstarting point for exploring the origins and implications of enduring understandings about the relationship between nations and states as the building blocks
of internationalsociety.
The idea of "one nation, one state" (the nation-state principle) and the
correspondingconviction that self-identified nations ought to have control of
their own states (national self-determination)yield a cluster of political and
ethical argumentswith both internal and external resonance. Internally,these
ideas are used to mobilize particularpopulations by legitimating and channeling frustrationin the face of exclusion from the dominantpolitical order,unjust
treatmentby those in power (especially vis-a-vis other identifiablegroups), and
lack of redress within existing governmentalstructures.Externally,these arguments and the assumptionsthey entail bolster nation-basedclaims in the global
arena, centered largely on the idea of a people's right to self-determination
contained in U.N. instrumentsand draftedin the context of decolonization.
From the Frenchrevolutionariesto Giuseppe Mazzini to Abdullah Ocalan,
political leaders have found the idea of the nation particularlyresonant and
powerful. The ambiguity of the nation makes it problematic as a conceptual
category but enhances its attractivenessas a platformfor political mobilization.
According to David Miller, a nation can be defined as "a community of people
with an aspirationto be politically self-determining,"and a state as "the set of
political institutions that they may aspire to possess for themselves."2 Statehood is valued because it enshrines internalcontrol over a given territoryand
population and external sovereignty in internationalrelations, including freedom from intervention by other states (except perhaps in cases of egregious
human rights abuse). Nations achieve internal control and external independence through recognition as sovereign states and thus as members of international society.
Sovereign statehood is not the only-and perhaps not even the most
common-political embodiment of nations in the contemporaryinternational
system, but it remains a basic aspirationand entitlementof nations in a purely
nation-statist model. Despite the growing importance of regional organizations, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and other
'See, for example, Malcolm Anderson,Frontiers: Territoryand State Formation in

the ModernWorld(Cambridge,U.K.: Polity, 1996), p. 2; G.P. Gooch, Studiesin

Modern History (London: Longmans, 1931), p. 217; Eugene Kamenka, "Political
Nationalism-The Evolutionof the Idea,"in E. Kamenka,ed., Nationalism:TheNature
and Evolution of an Idea (London:EdwardArnold, 1976), p. 10; Hans Kohn, Prelude
to Nation-States: The French and German Experience 1789-1815 (Princeton, N.J.:
Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 82; and Anthony Smith, National Identity(London: Penguin,
1991), p. 18.
2David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, U.K.:Clarendon,1995),p. 19.
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nonstate actors in internationalrelations, it is probablystill safe to say that we
live-or at least think we live-in a world of nation-states. The "right of
self-determination"of peoples enshrined in Article I of the United Nations
Charterand in Common Article 1 of the 1966 Covenants is generally limited
to the context of decolonization when understoodas a right to sovereign statehood.3 Yet this restriction is difficult to justify within a nation-statist model.
There is no self-evident reason why the metaoptionof separatestatehoodought
to be granted to former colonies but denied to other self-identified national
groups.
Of course, "the principle of equal rights and self-determinationof peoples"
is difficult to operationalizewithout a clear definition of "peoples."4 Virtually
all formulationsof self-determinationseem to take for grantedthe existence of
distinct and identifiable collectives, and for good reason:after all, if a nation is
defined only by its political institutions, then the nation-state principle is a
truism,and the story ends there.5Ian Brownlie's definition of self-determination
as "theright of cohesive nationalgroups ('peoples') to choose for themselves a
form of political organizationand their relation to other groups";John Stuart
Mill's observationthat "one hardlyknows what any division of the humanrace
should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective
bodies of humanbeings they choose to associate themselves";and ErnestGellner's affirmationthat"nationalismis primarilya political principle,which holds
that the political and the national unit should be congruent"-all postulate the
existence of prepolitical nations that provide an independent standardfor the
legitimacy of states.6
In the nation-statist model, state legitimacy depends on whether the state
embodies a particularnation, or at least whether the nations within the state
have consented to its control. Whetheror not nations are actually freestanding
entities that exist in the world, the idea of national self-determination as a
logical corollary of the nation-state principle offers a potent platformfor chal-

3See Aureliu Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination:Historical and Current
Development on the Basis of UN Documents, E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev. 1; and H6ctor
Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination:Implementationof UN Resolutions,

1.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.
4 WoodrowWilson'sallegedcommentthathe "knowsa peoplewhenhe sees one"
provideslittlereassuranceon this point.
this tautologyis stronglyendorsedby existingstatesseekingto
5Not surprisingly,
precludesecessionistclaims.
6Ian Brownlie,Principles of Public InternationalLaw, 5thed. (Oxford,U.K.: Oxford
Government"
(1861),
UniversityPress,1998),p. 599;JohnStuartMill,"Representative

ThreeEssays: On Liberty,RepresentativeGovernment,and The Subjectionof Women

(London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1975), p. 381; and ErnestGellner,Nationsand
Nationalism(Oxford,U.K.:Blackwell,1983),p. 1.
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lenging the political and territorialstatusquo.7 Practicalobstacles and conflicts
may arise, but these do not impairthe soundness of the principle itself: to each
nation, its own state.
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE NOTION
OF VOLUNTARIST NATIONALISM
Where does the FrenchRevolution fit into all of this? Proponentsof the nationstate principle tend to take it as a given-a set of core assumptions based on
shared understandings,if not common sense. But there is nothing natural or
inevitable aboutnation-states, and few states in the world conform to this ideal
model. Far from making the presumedcongruence between nations and states
obsolete, this disjunctiongives rise to conflicting and potentially irreconcilable
perspectives and expectations. The tension between the pervasiveness of nonnationalstatesandthe persistenceof normativestandardsbasedlargely,if implicitly, on the nation-state principle fuels inconsistency and even incoherence in
internationallaw and practice.
The idea of an internationalsystem composed of sovereign states, generally
dubbed the Westphalianmodel, provides a structuralframeworkfor relations
between distinct political and territorialunits. Standingalone, this model offers
few criteriabesides effective control for delineating states and investing them
with the rights and duties of membershipin internationalsociety. Elements of
this model characterizecurrentinternationalrelations:effective control remains
an important(though no longer exclusive) test for state recognition, and states
are still consideredthe centralmembersof internationalsociety, with this status
enshrinedby membershipin the United Nations.
Although the United Nations could not be called the "United States" for
obvious reasons, thereis somethingdeeper at work in the frequentconflation of
the terms "nation"and "state" in popular, political, and even scholarly discourse. This "somethingdeeper" stems largely from the tacit assumptionthat
all states are or should be nation-states. If the Treatyof Westphaliaprovides a
convenient, though not entirely historically accurate,shorthandfor the birth of
the modern state system, then the French Revolution performs a similar function for the idea of the modern nation-state.
In the ideal version of this model, prepoliticalnations should determinethe
legitimacy of states for both consequentialistand deontological reasons. On a
practicallevel, nationalties arepresumedto ensurethe cohesiveness and administrability of a linguistically and culturally unified population and to motivate

7

see ChimeneI. Keitner,"Power
Fora briefanalyticaloverviewof thisphenomenon,

and Identity in Nationalist Conflicts," OxfordInternational Review 8, No. 2 (1997),

pp. 2-10.
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the compliance and commitment of a polity's members to its institutions and
commands, based on the presumedidentificationbetween the governmentand
the governed. This presumed identification is also valued in itself as a moral
good because of the conviction that people should be-and would choose to
be-governed by members of their own community. In this picture, national
self-determinationsupports the values of both collective identity and individual choice.
The two senses of self-government-participation of the populationin political decisions through voting and identity between the government and the
governed-are often conflated. There are at least two reasons why the idea of
national self-determination(the presumptionthat a nation should have control
of its own state) is often closely connected to ideals of liberation and democratic self-governance. First, it seems intuitively plausible (if not borne out by
experience) that a people is best able to choose and to implement its own conception of the good life when governed by its own members. Second, the concrete historical connection between the rise of the nation as a political platform
and the overthrow of monarchy during the French Revolution helped fuse the
ideas of national self-determinationand popularsovereignty in political rhetoric and in the popularimagination.
Despite the auspicious beginnings of the FrenchRevolution in proclaiming
the nationthe fundamentalsource of political sovereigntyand legitimacy,Napoleonic conquest in the early nineteenth century and Germanaggression in the
twentieth revealed the darkerside of nationalist policies. They demonstrated
the potential for internal oppression and the appetite for external domination.
More recently, campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" and the rise of the rhetoric of
"blood and belonging" in the Balkans and other regions have furtherdiscredited the idea that national bonds based on the reality or the fiction of common
descent should be regardedas legitimate foundationsof modernpolitical communities. The feeling persists that there is something important,in principle
and practice, behind the conviction that shared identity and understandingis
valuable, and perhaps even necessary for a democratic polity to remain cohesive and responsive to its members' needs. This intuition is particularlystrong
in the face of disunity and discontent in what are perceived as increasingly
pluralistic and fragmentedstate populations.
The impulse to preserve some element of the nation-state idea has led to a
common distinctionbetween ethnic and civic varieties of nationalism;the latter
continues generallyto be advocatedand endorsed.The FrenchRevolution seems
to exemplify civic nationalism, as the French population at the time of the
Revolution was clearly too diverse to constitute an ethnic nation, and revolutionaryrhetorictended to focus on political rights ratherthan ethnic belonging.
Yet the uncritical identification of the French Revolution with a purely civic
model misses crucial aspects of the revolutionaryview of the nation as the basis
for political legitimacy and the ultimate source and holder of sovereignty.As
This content downloaded from 74.217.200.33 on Thu, 25 Jun 2015 21:09:13 UTC
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noted, the nation-state principle makes sense as a standardfor territorialdelineation and political control only if one can point to a prepolitical nation independent of its institutional manifestations. It would be circular to appeal to
institutions to justify institutions, so nationalist leaders must appeal to something else.
The discrediting of strategies that invoke a preexisting ethnic "something
else," based on the idea of individuals belonging involuntarilyand essentially
to an ethnic nation, has led to supportfor voluntaristmodels of national membership as the productsof individual choice. But this choice cannot simply be
manifested in allegiance to the political institutions of the state. One must be
able to differentiate between the nation and the state, both conceptually and
concretely,if the formeris to serve as a basis for legitimatingor challenging the
latter.The following analysis of revolutionaryprinciples and practice reveals
that appeals to civic nationhoodare not immune from the problems associated
with invoking other prepolitical forms of belonging. At the same time, the
importanceof cohesion, understanding,and commitmentwithin a political body
suggests why nationalistargumentsare persuasive to begin with and why they
cannot be completely discreditedor ignored.
THE FOUR PARADOXES
The French Revolution, as might be expected, may be characterizedby multiple and even competing historical narratives. The conjunction of numerous
factors provided the occasion for a series of uprisings and political challenges
that began in 1789 and enduredfor the better part of a decade: the perceived
inefficiency and financial instability of the monarchyunderLouis XVI; a pervasive resentmenttowardthe privileges of the nobility and the clergy harbored
by the increasinglypowerfulmerchantandprofessionalclasses (theThirdEstate);
insecurity and agitation among peasants resulting in part from a particularly
bad harvest after the winter of 1788; and an intellectual climate charged by a
spirit of inquiry and challenge to existing models, not least in mattersof government. Although this analysis focuses on the conceptual and institutional
transformationsof the revolutionarydecade, it is importantnot to lose sight of
the socioeconomic preconditionsto these fundamentalshifts.
Political terms,especially new andabstractones, arenot used in precisely the
sameway by eachcontemporaryspeaker,nordo theytravelthroughtime andspace
unchanged.But the unmistakablerise to prominenceof the "nation"in revolutionary rhetoric, including justifications for both domestic and international
actions, andthe subsequentattributionof the idea of nation-statehoodto the revolutionaryexperience,arguestronglyin favorof examiningrevolutionarydebates
as a key to a deeper understandingof the uses and abuses of nationhood.
A study of the emergence of the nation as a political platform during the
French Revolution produces a frameworkof four paradoxes:conception, conThis content downloaded from 74.217.200.33 on Thu, 25 Jun 2015 21:09:13 UTC
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stitution,composition, and confrontation.The tensions capturedby these headings remainrelevant and problematicin the present.The paradoxof conception
relates to the difficulty of thinking of the nation as an entity separatefrom its
political institutions. The nation-state principle in theory (if not in practice)
treats nations as preexisting groups of people united by a certain kind of bond
that makes them particularlysuited to and deserving of exclusive control over
their own governmentand territory.Yet it is unclear how this notion of prepolitical nationhoodapplies to the case of a voluntaristnation ostensibly defined
by individual choice and commitment rather than biological characteristics,
reflecting the kind of nation the French Revolution is generally seen as having
championed and the model of nationhoodupheld by many as the most appealing and deserving of supporttoday.
The paradoxof constitutionhighlights a second problem-that is, identifying who can speak legitimately on the nation's behalf. The risk that political
powerseekers will take advantageof the availability of nationalistplatformsto
furthertheir own aims may be difficult to avoid. This suggests a need for caution in attributingprima facie legitimacy to those who claim to speak for the
nation. At the same time, it is unclear that other actors could effectively drive
political and institutionalchange and whether they could do so in the name of
something other than the nation.
The paradox of composition focuses on a later stage of the nation-state's
development, when the time comes to delineate insiders and outsiders to establish government policies and distribute social benefits. Even-and perhaps
especially-in a voluntaristnation, the dual impulses to refine the definition of
national membership (to aid excluding political opponents) and to make it
"thicker"and more concrete (to solidify bonds of allegiance and belonging)
may engender illiberal and arbitrarilyrestrictive results.
Finally, the paradoxof confrontationfocuses on the principlesguiding interaction among sovereign political units in the internationalarena. During the
French revolutionaryperiod, the desire to reestablish France as a great power
within the existing internationalsystem operatedalongside many revolutionaries' self-assigned mission of transformingthatsystem into one composed exclusively of self-determining nation-states (self-determiningon a strictly French
model). The result of their efforts was a series of violent and protractedwars.
Taken together, these paradoxes illustrate the quandariesof the revolutionary
experiment and suggest the complexities underlying the idea of national selfdeterminationas a basis for internationalpolitical order.

Conception: How to Imagine a VoluntaristNation?
The paradox of conception highlights the difficulty of conceiving of a prepolitical entity without reference to its institutional manifestations,especially if
that entity is envisaged as "voluntarist"ratherthan defined by preexisting and
This content downloaded from 74.217.200.33 on Thu, 25 Jun 2015 21:09:13 UTC
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readily apparentcharacteristicsand ties. Although such complications could
have renderednationalistargumentsmore precariousand less useful duringthe
French revolutionary period, they in fact contributedto the expediency and
popularity of the nation as a particularlymalleable and potent platform for
making political and territorialclaims.
During the eighteenth century,successive waves of political actors seeking
greaterinfluence within and beyond the monarchyfound that they first had to
challenge the self-referential and self-justifying quality of monarchicalrule.
They did this by developing and relying on the idea of the nation as distinct
from and prior to the king. This idea evoked both an embryonic notion of the
Frenchpopulationas a rights-bearing(if passive)constituencyanda moreabstract
vision of the nation as a historically transcendentsource of authorityseparate
from the monarch,who could no longer claim exclusively to embody or represent it.
Shifts in fundamentalunderstandingsabout the natureand justification of
political institutions(drivenlargely by power struggles among variouspolitical
actors) were accompaniedand catalyzed by transformationsin the words used
to express basic political concepts, and even in the concepts themselves. The
changes in everyday language were palpable, beginning in the 1750s and carrying through to the revolutionary decade. One contemporaryobserved the
following:
Never have the wordsnationand state been as frequentlyused as they are
today:thesetwo termswereneverutteredunderLouisXIV;even the idea of
themwas lacking.Wehaveneverbeen so awareas we aretodayof the rights
of the nationandof liberty.8
At the height of the absolute monarchy,the king was, in effect, the embodiment of three otherentities: the state (the territoryplus the administrativestructure),the nation(the populationthoughtof in an abstractbut territoriallydefined
fashion), and the people (his actual subjects). A distinction among these categories was precludedby definition.
By 1766, Louis XV could no longer simply assert his authorityas had his
ostensibly omnipotentpredecessor.Instead, he felt compelled to defend it:
As if anyonecouldforgetthatthesovereignpowerresidesin mypersononly...
that public orderin its entiretyemanatesfrom me and that the rights and
interestsof the nation,whichsomedareto regardas a separatebodyfromthe
ed., Jour8Marquisd'Argenson,entryfromJune26, 1754,in JacquesB. Rathdry,

nal et memoires du marquis d'Argenson, vol. 8 (Paris, 1866), p. 315; translatedin
Keith Michael Baker, Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political
Culture in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,

1990),p. 22.
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monarch,arenecessarilyunitedwithmy rightsandinterests,andreposeonly
in my hands.9
By affirmingthat the nation's interestswere united with his own and depended
on him, Louis XV in fact contributedto the very distinction that he was trying
to negate. Louis XVI did the same in calling for the Nation to rescue the State
during the fiscal crisis of 1788-89. The nation could perhapsbolster the state,
but it could also check it. This was the first step on the path to the nation
becoming the state's very basis.
This process of consolidatingthe self-image of the Frenchpeople as a nation
was reflected in and enhancedby the use of the adjective "national."One satirical tract written in the form of a dictionary (a common polemical strategy)
explains this word, wryly emphasizing its pervasiveness:
is an] adjectivethatqualifiesall thatbelongsto the nation;more["national"
over,everythingbelongsto the nation,so everythingis national.... Sincethe
revolutionourphysicalandmoralway of beinghasbecomeentirelynational;
our dress, from the cockadedown to the buckles,is national.Our way of
knowshow nationalit is! andour writtenworksare like our
thinking,Lord
o
thoughts.
This citation shows how all-encompassing the revolutionaryidea of the nation
could become." It provides testimony, however mocking, to the transformation of language and mentalities and to their manifestationin everyday life.
By the time of the Revolution, the nation was poised to become the central
platform for claims to political legitimacy and territorialcontrol. This was
reflected in the definition of crimes of treason and the words for describing it,
which ultimately went from lhse-majeste' (treason to the king) to lhse-nation,
lhse-patrie, lhse-libertd, and even lese-humanit" (treason to the nation, to the
country,to liberty,and to humanity).12 Changesin the word for treasonreflected

the prescribedtransferof loyalty from the king to the nation and to the values of
the French revolutionary nation-state. The meanings of these new political
9Jules Flammermonted., Remontrancesdu parlement de Paris au XVIIIesiecle,

vol. 2 (Paris,1888-98),p. 557:translatedin JohnRothney,TheBrittanyAffairandthe
Crisisof theAncienRegime(Oxford,U.K.:OxfordUniversityPress,1969),p. 177.
'0Pierre-Nicolas Chantreau,Dictionnaire national et anecdotique pour servir a
l'intelligence des mots dont notre langue s'est enrichie depuis la revolution, et a la
nouvelle signification qu'ont revue quelques anciens mots (Paris: Politicopolis, 1790),

pp. 132-33, author'strans.
1 The
exhibiton theRevolutionattheMuseeCarnavalet,
Paris,displays
permanent
from
dinnerware
mottoesto trunkswith metal
everything
paintedwith revolutionary
locks sculptedin the shapeof the Bastille.
12 BeatriceFry Hyslop, FrenchNationalismin 1789, Accordingto the GeneralCahiers

(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1934),p. 159.
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terms did not go uncontested. But far from compromising the importance of
new concepts, such debates in fact confirmedthe theoreticaland practicalcentrality of the nation in the emerging political order.
The revolutionaryaccount of the relationshipbetween king and nation, and
its expression in political vocabulary,ultimately defined the criteriafor political authorityin France.The conceptualrelationshipbetween nation and state in
a nation-statist frameworkis most clearly explained in Leon Duguit's (much
later) Treatiseon ConstitutionalLaw:
The nationis the originalholderand sourceof sovereignty.The nationis a
person,withall the attributesof personality,conscience,andwill. Theperson
nationis, in reality,distinctfromthe State;it is anteriorto it (the State);the
Statecannotexist except wherethereis a nation;andthe nationcan subsist
even whenthe Stateno longerexists or does not yet exist.13
This vision lies at the heart of a nation-basedaccount of the political and territorial legitimacy of states, on both the domestic (internal) and the international (external) levels.
The idea of a voluntaristnation seems compelling-not least for Western
liberals seeking to establish consistent global standardsfor state legitimacy-as
it appearsto offer groundsfor social cohesion, territorialdelineation, and political mobilization that are maximally inclusive and minimally predetermined.
But its viability as an internationalpolitical standard is by no means selfevident. The voluntaristnation seems at odds with the nation-statist assumption that there are preexisting nations, which, because of their prepolitical
solidarity, cohesion, and distinctiveness, are entitled to their own territorial
states. The question of what criteriaone could point to as evidence of the existence of a prepolitical,voluntaristnation remainsunanswered,jeopardizingthe
coherence of this category as a basis for adjudicatingpolitical and territorial
claims.

Constitution: How to Give the Nation a Political Voice?
As the precedingargumentsuggests, concretepower struggleswithin the French
monarchy served as a driving force behind the ever-increasing emphasis on
the idea of the nation. In coopting and implementingthe contractualistrequirement of popular consent (loosely adopted from political theorists including
Jean-JacquesRousseau)to bolstertheirown importance,the parlements(French
sovereign law courts) discovered and enshrinedthe effectiveness of claims for
political power made in the name of the nation, which was a rhetoricalentity
abstractenough to be manipulatedyet concrete enough to be compelling. Not
'3Lon Duguit, Traitede droit constitutionnel2d ed., vol. 1 (Paris: E. de Boccard,
1921), p. 607.
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surprisingly,the deliberate use of the nation by the parlements as a vehicle
for their own political ambitions had the unintended effect of opening the
door for other self-styled national spokespeople to override the parlements'
claims.
The paradoxof constitutionfocuses on the need to rely on those who speak
on behalfof the nationto validateandimplementthe nation'spoliticaldemands.'4
In theory,the revolutionarynation became a political actor;in practice, politics
became a competition between individualsand parties claiming to speak on the
nation's behalf. Political discourse became a kind of reverse ventriloquism,
whereby rhetoriciansasserted that they were speaking in the nation's name and
even with the nation's voice; conflicting claims led successive leaders to be
denouncedas "inauthentic"and replacedwith often equally precariouspretenders.'5 In this fashion, the nation developed into a central legitimating platform
without necessarily promotingthe interests of the individuals within it or contributingto political stability.
Thepoliticalclaimsof theparlementswerearticulatedandpopularizedthrough
official "remonstrances,"petitions submittedto the king andoften publishedand
circulatedillicitly amongthe populationat large.The remonstranceshadthreeimportanteffects from the perspective of this analysis. First, they emphasized the
distinction between king and state, extrapolatingfrom the abstractidea of socalled "fundamentallaws" as restraintson the arbitraryexercise of monarchical
powerto suggest the conditionalnatureof the king's legitimacy,separatefromthe
stable existence of the Frenchstate per se. Second, they reinforcedthe idea of a
people with its own rights and interests, which had to be protected(by the parlements) againstunjustifiedencroachment.Third,they enshrinedthe concept of
the nationas a particularlystrongandcompellingway to representtheFrenchpopulationas spatiallyunified andtemporallycontinuous,creatinga practiceof making political claims in the nation'sname.These threedevelopmentswere essential
stages in the emergence of the nation as the basis of the state's legitimacy and a
centralplatformfor claims to political power.
The parlementschampionedthe nation'simportanceincrementally.According to parliamentaryrhetoric, only those who upheld the rights of the nation
could stake a legitimate claim to political power. The more the parlementsfelt
their own existence was threatened,the more they emphasized the importance
of the nation and their unique role in protecting it. A typical remonstrance
insists on the importanceof consultingthe nation,representedby the parlements:

'4Thisleadsto a certaincircularitysince, as PaulGilbertsuggests,"theabilityto
support[and,one mightadd,to articulate]a claimto statehoodis partlyconstitutiveof
ournotionof a nation"("Criteria
of NationalityandtheEthicsof Self-Determination,"

History of EuropeanIdeas 16, Nos. 4-6 [1993], pp. 515-520; quote on p. 516).
5 This trope of authenticitysurfaces in both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism.
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Thisrightcouldnotbe lost fortheNation;it is imprescriptible,
inalienable.To
attackthisprincipleis to betraynotonlytheNation,butkingsthemselves;it is
to overturnthe constitutionof the Kingdom,it is to destroythe foundationof
the authorityof the Monarch.16

The parlements presented themselves as indispensable to the king's
political survival while they staked out their own political territory.Although
clever, this approachproved difficult to sustain, as the parlements'emphasis
on the rights of the nation eventually overrode their claims to bolster the
king. From mere guardians of the social contract, the parlements soon portrayed themselves as the defenders, and ultimately the voice, of the nation
itself.
The nationthusproveda crucialplatformfor the parlements'claims-as long
as they could ensurea monopoly on its use. Predictably,this strategyproveddangerous by paving the way for the appropriationof the parlements'argumentsby
other political contenders.The parlements'emphasis on the primacy of the nation andthe importanceof nationalconsent becamedisengaged from parliamentaryrhetoricandenteredpopularpolitical discourse,laying the foundationsfor a
radical reconceptualizationof the natureand origins of legitimate political authority,with ultimateconsequences beyond parliamentarycontrol.
Facing a debt crisis at the end of 1788, the king convoked the Estates General, an official meeting of representativesof the three estates (the clergy, the
nobility, and the ThirdEstate), last called in 1614. This move opened the door
for a new, more "authentic"set of national spokespeople to replace the parlements as the voice of the Frenchnation. Specifically, the ThirdEstate declared
itself the NationalAssembly in response to its perceived exclusion from meaningful political debates in an act often upheld as markingthe beginning of the
revolutionaryuprising. The title "NationalAssembly" captures the delegates'
conviction in the supremacyof the nation and their desire to be viewed as its
authoritativevoice.17
The dangerthatthe recognitionof authoritativenationalspokespeoplemight
underminethe voluntaristpremises behind supportfor popularparticipationin
governmentwas not lost on the critics of political reform.Andre-QuentinBude
tersely bemoaned: "The good of the people is the supreme law: a perfectly
vague maxim, and, by that alone, a,8perfectly tyrannical one." Jean-Pierre
'16Remonstrances of the Parlementof Bordeaux,February25, 1771; in Roger Bickart, Les Parlements et la notion de souverainetd nationale (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932),

p. 79, author'strans.

17Gazette nationale ou le moniteur universel, Assemblee Constituante 1, No. 9,

session of June 17, 1789, p. 83.
'8 Andre-Quentin Bude, Nouveau dictionnaire pour servir

a l'intelligence des ter-

mes mis en vogue par la Revolution (Paris, 1792), pp. 96-97, author's trans.
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Gallais concurred:"In every town, in every village, we find the nation exercising all the rights of sovereignty, which at times obtains for us ratherferocious
sovereigns." 19 These concerns, present from the beginning, were voiced with
increasingurgencyas the Revolutionprogressed.The strugglefor politicalpower
exacerbatedthe theoreticaltensions capturedin the paradoxof conception, with
ultimately authoritarianresults.
The creationof the NationalAssembly beganas partof an attemptto reinforce
monarchicallegitimacy by reaffirmingthe nation's supportfor the king in the
face of perceived usurpationof political power by the privileged classes. Yet
the king's reluctance to accept a constitutional mandate, which would have
circumscribedhis absolutepower, addedgrist to the mill of more radicalreform.
The National Assembly, created to representthe nation before the king, ended
up institutionalizingthe primacy of the nation itself.
The nation may be conceptualized as a prepolitical association, but it is
only by adopting concrete institutions that it can translate theoretical power
into effective political sway. This is where the paradox of constitution complicates the paradoxof conception. The practicalimperative of institutionalizing the nation to render its political claims effective means that those who
succeed in speaking for the nation will in fact become the authors of the national will.
In addition, because the much vaunted unity of national identity and purpose is often expressed in-if not created by-state institutions like the National Assembly, the nation and the state become even more difficult to
distinguish, further muddying the possibility of evaluating them separately.
This tends to underminethe value of the nation as an independentlegitimating
basis for the state or a means of adjudicating between rival territorialand
political claims. The paradox of constitution compounds this dilemma by enhancing the presumptivelegitimacy of nation-baseddemands without providing a guide to evaluate their credibility apart from the convictions of those
who make them.

Composition: How to Define Insiders and Outsiders?
The revolutionaryrevision of the Frenchpolity enshrinednational (as opposed
to royal) sovereignty as the source of and justification for political authority.
Article III of the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen
proclaimed:"The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.
No body, no individual may exercise any authority that does not emanate
19Jean-PierreGallais, Extraitd'un dictionnaireinutile, Composepar une Societe"en
commandite, & ridige par un homme seul (A 500 lieues de 1'Assembl6e nationale,

1790),p. 179, n. 1, author'strans.
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expressly from the nation."20 National self-determinationreplaced absolute
monarchyas the standardfor both domestic and internationallegitimacy.21
The idea of national sovereignty provided the theoreticalbasis for the constitution of the nation-state. But what about its concrete composition? Simply
positing the sovereignty of the nation was insufficient to ensure the viability of
the state created in the nation's name. Criteriafor national membershiphad to
be identified and bonds of solidarity cultivated to foster political allegiance,
compliance, and supportfor the revolutionaryregime. Despite the importance
of conceptualself-creation,nationalcohesion had to be based on more thanjust
a contractualfiction to underpinthe unity and effectiveness of the revolutionary state. The question was (and remains)how to forge a voluntaristnation.The
paradoxof composition encapsulatesthis imperativeand accounts for its potentially illiberal results.
Although the monarchical nation had been held together by the king and
delineatedby his administration,the revolutionariesdefined their version of the
nation more subjectively and even metaphysically,based on the people's will to
live together as a sovereign unit. The "will to live together" was assumed
to exist among members of the French nation (those who spoke the French
language or had a French "heart"), but not among undesirables: counterrevolutionaries, reactionarypriests, or (during the years of the Terror)those
who sought to challenge whoever happenedto be in power or was considered
politically or socially subversive. Solidaritywas forged positively throughsymbols and festivals, but also negatively throughexclusion and even executions.
As the decade progressed, the perceived precariousnessof successive revolutionaryregimes fostered an exclusionary and even monolithic definition of
national membershipin response to the need to galvanize the nation as a bulwarkagainstcompeting sources of political authorityand allegiance. This experience suggests how the process of national consolidation, even if based on
ostensibly voluntarist premises, may end up blurring the classic distinction
between civic-inclusive and ethnic-exclusive nationalisms.
The idea of the nation as a moral and political entity itself creates the need
to delineate members from nonmembers. In theory, principles of delineation
may be somewhat fluid and include, for example, an exit option. In practice,
such openness tends to work against the emotional resonanceand political util-

20JacquesGodechot,ed., Les Constitutionsde la France depuis 1789 (Paris:Flammarion,1995),p. 34, author'strans.
21
For example,Honore-Gabriel
Comtede Mirabeauinsistedin a speech to the
NationalAssemblythat "thereexists but one sole principleof governmentfor all
nations,I mean by thattheir own sovereignty."Quotedin Gazettenationaleou le

moniteur universel, Assemblee Constituante 4, No. 142, session of May 20, 1790,

p. 418, author'strans.
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ity of nationalist platforms. Nationalist leaders may feel that pure voluntarism
is simply not enough to hold the nation together and to guaranteesupport for
their control of the state. For a nation to establish a credible claim to its own
exclusive territoryand political institutions (or for credible claims to be made
in its name), it must be robust and to some extent self-sustaining.This presents
a central challenge to voluntaristnation-basedconceptions of the state.
Revolutionaryleaders found themselves having to fortify their voluntarist
conception of a French nation based on will with nonvoluntaristelements to
preserve the resonance and viability of their nation-based claims. The most
concrete manifestationof this modification on a territoriallevel was the idea of
national self-determinationas a one-way street. Once the revolutionarynationstate's parametershad been defined by those in power (ostensibly in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned), the inviolability of national
unity precludedsecession of a "part"from the "whole."This propositionbecame
especially importantin attemptsto assert the right of all nations to determine
their own political destiny (for example, for Avignon to "choose" to renounce
its papal ties and incorporateitself into France), while precludingby definition
the secession of any partof France.As GeneralJacquesFranqoisMenou, reporting for the diplomatic committee on Avignon, explained:
A peoplethatis partof a society,thatis boundby a contract,cannotmakeitself
independentexceptby the consentof the othercontractingparts;but [a people] thatcomposesa completesocietyin itself, thatneverformedpartof any
other,that [people]is free, sovereign;it can adoptas it wishes any formof
nonehastherightto preventit fromdoingso; forthegovernment
government;
is only madefor the governed.... But, it will be said, it wouldresultfrom
theseprinciplesthateachpartof the Frenchempirecoulddeclareitself independent.I answerthatno partof theFrenchempireis actuallyindependent
by
thatvery fact thatit is partof a societywith whichit has contracted.... No
partof the empirehas the rightto breakthis contract.22
By equating the French people with a nation that was by definition unified
and internallycohesive, revolutionaryleaders sought to precludethe possibility
of internalthreatsto their own political supremacy,quickly developing mechanisms to suppress and excise those that did emerge. The indivisibility of sovereignty reinforcedthe indivisibility of the nation, the entity said to possess it.
And, in a twist characteristicof the Revolution, that indivisibility, that imperative of unity, and that automaticself-legitimation were claimed by the leaders
of the (re)constitutedstate once it had been affirmed,or they had defined it, as
national. The circle of self-validation closed once again.

22Gazette nationale ou le moniteur
universel, Assemble Constituante8, No. 121,
session of April 30, 1791, pp. 264-265, author'strans.
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Beyond the exclusionary criteriafor membershipbased on political ideology, a culturaldefinition of the nation also emergedto bolster the nation'sclaim
for entitlement to political self-expression in state institutions.These two sets
of criteria-ideological and cultural-were related. For example, attempts to
enforce linguistic uniformitybecame a centralmeans of promotingand disseminatingthe new regime's policies, especially in ruralareasthatrisked becoming
counter-revolutionaryenclaves under the influence of priests who refused to
swear allegiance to the French constitution.23Language became an essential
tool for forging unity and concretizing identity.As the Revolution progressed,
policies of linguistic homogenizationreinforcedthe importanceof culturalsimilarity alluded to by some prerevolutionarydefinitions of the nation but until
then subordinatedto territorialand administrativeconceptions.
The Frenchlanguage became both constitutive and emblematic of political
and cultural solidarity.Its use became an essential markerof and medium for
French national identity, blurringthe distinction between voluntaristand nonvoluntaristnations.24The utility of a common language to the formation and
articulationof a sharedpolitical will led to the promotionof linguistic uniformity. But the French language acquired much more than purely instrumental
importance.It became emblematic and constitutive of national identity itself.
The centralityof language to identity-formationultimately trumpedthe acceptance of culturalpluralismand the individualrightto choose one's own linguistic and culturalties.
The ostensibly voluntaristFrenchnation thereforesought more substantive
and permanentfoundations that began to point toward a more restrictive and
even essentialist definition of membership.In an ideal civic nation, voluntarism becomes a platformfor a sense of identificationand loyalty, with common
participation,or at least representation,acting as a social and political cement.
The question of whether or not pure voluntarism, with or without an "exit
option," is strong enough to define and sustain an autonomous political unit
remains contentious. The revolutionariesclearly felt that more was needed, as
evidenced by their promotion of strict language policies and quasi-religious
ritualsthatinvoked common historicties and a shareddestiny amongthe French
23The "CivilConstitutionof the Clergy"in 1790 suppressedreligiousordersand

requiredall prieststo swear an oath of allegianceto the nation,the king, and the
constitution.The refusalof manyto do this createda profounddivisionwithinthe
clergyandmoregenerallywithinFrance.
les
24See Abbe de Gr6goire,"Rapportsur la n6cessiteet les moyensd'andantir
l'usagede la languefranqaise,"16 prairial,yearII;reprinted
patoiset d'universaliser
in H. de Certeau, D. Julia, and J. Revel, eds., Une politique de la langue. La Rdpubliquefrangaise et les patois: L'enquete de l'Abbd Grdgoire(Paris: Gallimard, 1975),

pp. 300-317; and Bertrandde Barere,"Rapportdu comit6de salutpubliquesur les
idiomes,"8 pluvi6se,yearII;reprintedin ibid.,pp. 291-299.
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people.25 This perceived need for strong bonds among a nation's members,
capturedin the paradoxof composition, continues to plague attemptsto develop
viable models of inclusive civic nationhoodtoday.

Confrontation: How to Interact with Other Political Units?
The paradox of confrontationevokes the challenges faced by French revolutionaries in their attempt to implement a universalist nationalism during the
revolutionarywars of the 1790s-that is, to spreadthe revolutionaryideals of
national sovereignty and national self-determinationin Europe. They did this
through a policy of territorialannexation and the creation of virtual satellite
states with French administrationsin areas of Belgium, Holland, Switzerland,
Germany,and even Italy.26
The revolutionaryconception of internationalsociety embodied the classic
and enduringtension between cosmopolitanand nationalistvisions andbetween
the idea of a single humanfamily and the notion of the nation as a self-enclosed
moral and political unit. The revolutionary attempt to spread France's own
model of nationalself-determinationas a universalideal was particularlyantagonistic and destabilizing in eighteenth-centuryEurope,which was composed of
monarchicalstates.
The revolutionary reconception and reconstructionof the French nationstate had direct implications for foreign policy and internationalrelations in at
least three ways. First, the revolutionariessaw their principles as relevant not
only to the French nation, but also to humanity as a whole, compounding the
implicit challenge the French example posed to the legitimacy of all European
monarchies. Second, on a more active level, the French deemed themselves
empowered to act on behalf of Europeanpeoples whose freedom was compromised by constitutionalarrangementsthat failed to recognize their sovereignty
and rights. Third, the revolutionary conception of international society that
flowed from its domestic constitutiveprinciplesrequiredthe creationof a world
of sovereignpeoples unencumberedby the despotismof existing states-a world
the revolutionariescharged themselves with creating, when not by invitation,
then by military force.
The principleof nationalsovereignty at the heartof the revolutionaryvision
was fundamentallyat odds with the level of interference requiredby France's
self-appointedliberationistmission, revealing the connection (andthe potential
conflict) betweenprinciplesof constitutionandpatternsof confrontation.Inspired
25See, e.g., Confideration nationale, ou re'citexact et circonstancie de tout ce qui
s'est pass" a Paris, le 14 juillet 1790, a la Fid"ration (Paris: Garnery,1790).

26See JacquesDehaussy,"LaRevolutionfranqaiseet le droitdes gens,"in Re'volu-

tion et droit international (Paris: A. Pedone, 1989), p. 96.
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by a conviction in the moral unity of humankind,the revolutionariesclung to
theiremancipatoryproject,while handlingits contradictoryimplicationsin ingenious but often pernicious ways.
As suggested previously, the cornerstoneof revolutionarypolitical theory
was the idea of the nation as the source and first holder of sovereignty, separate from and prior to both the king and the state. Within France, the National
Assembly drew its legitimacy from its claim to representthe French nation.
The problem came when it and its successors pursuedthe self-appointed task
of speaking on behalf of other nations, while acting to uphold their definition of their interests, based on their own "universal"standardsof legitimacy
and justice. The revolutionary idea of self-determination for other nations
demanded political organization in accordance with a French administrative
model, as well as with ideological and material support for the French wartime cause.
Revolutionarythinkersreconciled national sovereignty with the vision of a
commonhumanityby offeringa Frenchdefinitionof whatthathumanityentailed.
The revolutionariestook their own struggle to be exemplaryfor the world as a
whole. As such, being faithful to their ethical and political principles meant
embracinga liberationistmission thatreconciledthe apparentlydivergentideals
of cosmopolitanism and French nationalismby defining the first as the culmination of the second. This formed the ideological basis for the exportation of
French principles and institutionsduringthe 1790s as the essence of "Revolutionary Messianism." The revolutionaries were nationalists in championing
France and universalistsin upholding the French nation as the embodimentof
ideals for all of humanity.The revolutionaryethos was so powerful precisely
because of its ability to mobilize national sentiment aroundthe promotion of
allegedly universal values.
As some contemporariesforesaw, the seeds of imperialismwere contained
in even the most ostensibly liberationistrhetoric.The revolutionaries'ideal of
unity based on reason entailed a certain assumption of doctrinal and institutional uniformity,characteristicof "revolutionism"as a strandof international
theory described by MartinWight.27The perceived need for collective mobilization while facing internaland external threatstransformedthe assumption
of uniformityinto an imperative.Revolutionaryideology had an (inter)nationalist ontology (internationalsociety composed of distinct nations), a cosmopolbased on ideals
itan morality(with those nationsjoined by bonds of "fraternity,"
of liberty and equality), and universalist ambitions (concerned with spreading
and implementingthe revolutionaryinterpretationof liberty, equality, and fraternity domestically and internationally).The revolutionarycase is instructive
27Martin Wight,in GabrielleWightand BrianPorter,eds., International Theory:
TheThreeTraditions(London:LeicesterUniversityPress, 1991),pp. 8-12.
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as a universalist nationalismbased on cosmopolitan ideals, with echoes in liberal universalism today.28
Although expansionist enterpriseson the partof revolutionaryFranceled to
rampantdisillusionment with French ideals among occupied populations, this
did not entail rejectionof nationalself-determinationas a whole, but only of the
French version of it. In fact, the French occupation and creation of virtual
satellite states prompted local populations to draw on, consolidate, and even
romanticizetheir own indigenous identities and traditionsas a bulwarkagainst
French influence. This is the paradoxor contradictionthat arises in the attempt
to implement a universalist doctrine of national self-determination.As long as
the French insisted that neighboring nations "determinethemselves" exclusively in France's own image, their posture as self-styled liberatorswas bound
to undermineitself and appearnaively hypocritical,if not intentionallyduplicitous. The French revolutionary rhetoric of liberation and national selfdeterminationdid indeed imprintitself on political discourse and on the popular
imagination.Yet these ideas were more likely to be used againstFrancethan for
it, in an act of ideological appropriationthat foreshadowed the dynamic of
twentieth-centuryanticolonial movements.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The study of the French Revolution summarized above was prompted by a
desire to establish a historically groundedfoothold in the morass of assumptions and expectations that are embedded in the nation-state principle. The
paradoxesof conception,constitution,composition,andconfrontationarederived
from this historical analysis but are also designed to serve as a frameworkfor
analyzing and evaluating other nation-basedclaims. Each paradoxhighlights a
valuable use of the idea of the nation as a platformfor political liberationin an
internationalsociety composed of distinct, self-governing political and territorial units. But each benefit entails a correspondingwarning that should form
partof any inquiryinto the legitimacy of claims on the partof actualor would-be
nation-states.
The paradoxof conception highlights the importanceof being able to appeal
to the governed as the source of political authority,especially as a basis for
rule.Strongversionsof this argumentgo beyondmerely
challengingauthoritarian
demandingpopularparticipationin governmentand actually posit the theoretical and factual existence of a prepolitical nation whose consent is requiredto
28For an expandedaccountof this phenomenon,see ChimeneKeitner,"Warand
Nationalismin the FrenchRevolution:The Theoreticaland PracticalChallengesof
UniversalistNationalism,"
ASENBulletin,No. 17 (1999), pp. 12-19.
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legitimate the structureand exercise of governmentalpower.This idea becomes
pivotal in claims that challenge the validity of political and territorialborders
since the boundariesof "the nation"will not necessarily coincide with those of
a particularstate. When these boundariesconflict, appeals are often made to
history (for example, long-standingtitle to territoryand historicalcontinuity as
a distinct and previously self-governing group) in constructing a story about
corrective justice to validate nation-based claims. These kinds of arguments
rely on the premise that nations are ethically, conceptually, and even historically distinctfrom andpriorto states.The presumedconnectionbetweennational
self-determinationand ideals of independenceand democraticself-governance
facilitate and enhance the effectiveness of this rhetoricalmove.
Yet there is a danger that this idea of prepolitical nationhood will become
abstract,reified, and ultimately detached from the welfare and concerns of the
people it purportsto encompass. The potential is magnified by the tendency of
various groupsand institutionalactorsto use claims on behalf of "thenation"as
weapons in political power struggles. This leads to the paradoxof constitution,
which suggests how the claim to represent the people can be used both to
promote and to underminedemocraticrule.
Once again, the idea of the nation is a double-edged sword. On the one
hand, it is importantfor people to see themselves reflected in and represented
by their political institutions so that they can accept the results of the political
process as fair, legitimate, and binding. On the other hand, simply upholding the idea of rule by the people begs the question of which population is
the appropriatereferentfor establishing the territorialand demographicparameters of legitimate governance and how best to institutionalize popular selfdeterminationso imagined.
The principle of one person, one vote is valid only if constituents perceive
themselves as sufficiently united so that they will accept the majoritydecision
on any particularissue as legitimate and binding. The legitimacy of majoritarian rule depends on the ability of the minorityto become the majority,or for a
given individual to be part of either the minorityor the majority,depending on
the issue at hand. This possibility presumes some uniformityin basic political
and social values so that no particularsubset of the populationis categorically
relegatedto minoritystatus and all membersof the polity are able to participate
in and influence the outcome of political decisions.
The political challenge of nationhoodin multinationalstates stems from the
conviction thatthe membersof a nationhave so much in common thatthey will
inevitably identify themselves as a permanentsubset of the larger state population, negating the preconditionsof democraticlegitimacy outlined above. The
nation-state principle in its pure form precludes the need to address the problems of "deeply divided" societies precisely because national and state boundaries are presumed congruent by definition. The simultaneous discrediting of
assimilationism and the reluctance to endorse secession among "liberal"
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approachesto this issue create an urgent need to find acceptable and effective
ways of fosteringcohesion, compliance,andcommitmentin multinationalstates.
These problems are insufficiently recognized and cannot be addressed adequately within the enduringly(if often implicitly) nation-statist terms of many
academic and political debates.29
Such concerns lead directly to the paradoxof composition as anothersite of
political contestation in the French Revolution and today. The United States
prides itself on being an open and inclusive model of citizenship based on
common allegiance to a set of political principles (albeit an increasingly contested one). Yet its abysmally low voter turnout rates, intergroup violence,
literal walling-off of private communities, and formation of militaristic antigovernment organizations testify to a worrisome lack of social cohesion and
commitment to a common political project.
The exclusionary potential of ethnic nationhood seems clear and acknowledges its susceptibility to abuse as a basis for state authority and legitimacy.
But even (and perhapsespecially) in nonethnically based states, there remains
an importantneed to harness or create some kind of social glue among citizens
and some normativebasis for attachmentto andrespect for political institutions.
Theoretically, the nation-state principle makes sense only if nations are
assumed to be cohesive and somewhat unitary;otherwise, there is no apparent
reason to look to nations as the normative bases for constructing territorially
separateand politically independentstates. Fundamentalreconceptualizations
of the natureof identity,territoriality,and governancemay be needed, but none
will succeed that do not account for the factors supportingthe development of
the nation-state principle and the reasons for its perversions and failures.
Even with the entrenchmentof certainnormsof customaryinternationallaw
and the emergence of concepts such as crimes against humanity and universal
jurisdiction,thereremainfundamentaland apparentlyirreconcilabledifferences
in values and perspectives among states. The process of developing an internationalcriminalcourt has both demonstratedthe potential for cross-boundary
consensusandcooperationandpainfullyrevealedits outerlimits.Culturaldiversity
does not just involve tolerating visibly different languages, customs, and holidays; it requiresrecognizing and providing space for completely different and
encompassingways of life that,so far,continue to find theirhighest political expression in the aspirationfor or reality of a sovereign state. Even ostensibly universal values come up against the challenge of nonnegotiable conflicts. It is
futile to rely on the force of the better argumentwhen the dialogue cannot proceed beyond what the terms of discussion are or should be.

29For a related critique of proposals for "civic nationalism"and "constitutional
patriotism,"see Chimene Keitner, "The 'False Promise' of Civic Nationalism,"Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28, No. 2 (1999), pp. 341-351.
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The paradoxof confrontationaddresses this tension between universalism
and particularismin the global arena,suggesting both the positive and the dangerous aspects of the (often self-appointed)quest to create a betterworld, generally in the image of its proponents.This observationshould not lead to a blind
endorsement of any practice deemed to be culturally specific, but it should
encourage humility in the promotionof one's own values and a willingness to
entertain the possibility that other legitimate perspectives exist. The radical
disjunction between liberationistends and coercive means will not be lost on
the objects of such efforts or on third-partyobservers.Thereareno easy answers,
but there are certainly attitudesand actions that make one's argumentsmore or
less attractiveto those they are designed to reach.
Although these propositionsare derived from a specific study of the French
Revolution, they also captureand clarify some basic intuitions about the issues
at stake in adhering,wholly or partly,to the idea of an internationalsociety of
nation-states.
The nation-state principle, even if allegedly outmoded, continues to provide tacit supportfor conflicting claims to political and territorialcontrol in the
internationalarena.It bolsters the normativefoundationsof the sovereignty of
states and gives self-identified nations a powerful instrumentfor challenging
the political and territorialstatus quo, based on the argumentthat state borders
do not follow the contoursof prepoliticalnations.The attractivenessof the idea
of state sovereignty is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, despite the
proliferationof multinationaland transnationalorganizations;in the short term,
processes of "globalization"may sparka retreatinto statist forms.
The appeal to a civic, as opposed to ethnic, variety of nationalismdoes not
seem the best way to address the risk that such a retreatwill lead to internal
assimilation and external belligerence. Any explicit or implied appeal to prepolitical nationhoodis likely to create analogous problems. Claims to national
self-determinationbased on a theory of correctinghistoricalinjustice should be
dealt with on these terms,ratherthanby invoking a fiction of prepoliticalnationhood. Although this may entail replacing one allegedly arbitrarystatus quo
with a previous one, it at least avoids the problemof differentialcitizenship in
new, nation-basedstates that distinguish authenticmembersof the nation from
"stranded"outsiders (for example, citizenship dilemmas in the Baltics).
How can cohesion in andcommitmentto existing andnew polities be ensured
without recourse to the idea of nationhood?The emphasis on democraticgovernance is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. Traditionalliberal
notions of majority rule are insufficient to address the relationship between
identity-basedminorities and majorities in multinationalstates. Also, Western
ideas of democracy depend on economic foundationsand societal understandings that are not present in many parts of the world. We should neither underestimate nor overestimate how much people have in common in our quest to
imagine and implement new forms of global political life. Underestimation
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may breed complacency, while overestimationmay foster heavy-handedpolicies that create more resentmentthan positive change. As with most things in
life, we as internationaltheorists and practitionerswould be well advised to
embrace the twin virtues of flexibility and balance as we attemptto navigate
this difficult terrain.

CONCLUSIONS: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS
AND ENTITLEMENTS
Just as the political possibility of secession today depends on the acceptance of
national self-determinationas a legitimate political goal (one recognized informally in shared sets of understandings,or formally in internationallaw), the
political paths available to the French revolutionaries were informed, if not
determined,by certain conceptual limits. In the 1790s, the French Revolution
met with fierce opposition by political elites in the rest of Europe, precisely
because it was perceived as exporting a new standardof political legitimacy
that was fundamentally at odds with prevailing monarchical and dynastic
principles. In the last century,WoodrowWilson realized the unintendedconsequences of his rhetorical support for national self-determinationwhen representatives of nationalities he had never even heard of flocked to him as a
champion for their separatistaspirations,demonstratingthe power of ideas in
grounding and fueling concrete political claims.30
Given the pervasiveness of multinationalstates and transnationalprocesses,
the nation-state principle may strike some as having little contemporaryrelevance. In fact, the widespread incongruitybetween theory and practice makes
the nation-state idea more, not less, compelling as a subject of analysis. The
presumed connection between nations and states still underlies and fuels the
rhetoric of national sovereignty and the propagationof nation-based claims.
This dynamic is especially evident in the continued resonance of appeals to
nationalself-determination,in which leadersof stateless nationsuse the assumption thatnations and states should be congruentto justify demandsfor increased
political autonomyand even independencefor specific nationalgroups.As long
as the nation-state idea informs the perceptions, assumptions, expectations,
and attitudes of actual and would-be internationalactors (whether or not it is
widely corroboratedby the political status quo), it will continue to shape the
limits of our internationalpolitical imaginationby providing groundsfor competing claims to power and compromisingthe attractivenessof alternative,nonstate options.
30WoodrowWilson,speechto theCommitteeon ForeignRelationsof theSenateon
August 19, 1919; in H.W.V.Temperley,A History of the Peace Conferenceof Paris,
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Politics is not just about the exercise of power, but also about its justification. Power can best be exercised and compliance ensured when those subjected to it believe in its legitimacy. The use of the nation as a political platform
was and is more thanjust a rhetoricaldevice. It is a way of mobilizing individuals by shaping their conceptions of their political entitlements and their correspondingexpectationsaboutwhatconstitutesa cognizable grievanceandwhat
avenues are available for seeking redress.This intuitive observation,borne out
by a study of the Frenchrevolutionaryexperience, suggests at least two possibilities for mitigating the incompatibilityof conflicting political and territorial
claims: first, reduce the sense of entitlementto nation-statehoodbuilt into current understandingsof the internationalsystem; and second, create viable alternatives that maximize political autonomy while minimizing competition over
limited resources, especially territory.
The fundamentalconstitutive puzzle of internationalsociety remains the
question of how groups of individuals should organize and govern themselves.
Conceptual frameworkslike the one developed here can help isolate the tensions and assumptionsimplicit in various nationalistargumentsand contribute
to a more incisive evaluationof their foundationsand potentialresults. In addition, the historical analysis presented above strongly suggests the need to elucidate furtherthe relationshipbetween the internaland external dimensions of
statehood.While the barrierbetween "inside"and "outside"is often taken for
grantedby both internationalrelations scholars and political theorists, its theoretical and practicalimpermeabilityis hardlyself-evident in a dynamic,diverse,
and developing world.
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